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Abstract
Risk taking is a complex heterogeneous construct that has proven difficult to assess,
especially when using behavioral tasks. A new measure, the Assessment of Physical Risk Taking
(APRT) is presented as a comprehensive assessment of several factors of risk. Specifically, the
measure seeks to examine the effects of several decision-making elements (e.g., probability of
success and failure, magnitude of reward and punishment) of different types of physically risky
behaviors and produce a variety of different outcome scores. Participants (N = 256) completed
APRT in a laboratory setting, with half being assigned to an enforced Delay condition. Main
effects, two-way interactions among five within-subject factors, and interactions between the
within-subject factors and Delay were estimated for four APRT outcome scores using
Generalized Estimating Equations. Results indicated that Injury Magnitude and Injury
Probability exerted much stronger effects than any of the other independent variables. The
implications of these results are discussed in the context of the future of behavioral risk-taking
tasks and studies
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Introduction
The concept of risk taking is a broad and often quite heterogenous variable used in many
areas of research. Because of its relationship to dangerous or otherwise problematic behaviors,
many researchers seek to accurately assess risk-taking as a means of both predicting these future
behaviors, as well as understanding how risk-taking interacts with other psychosocial variables
and outcomes, such as psychopathology or personality traits. Non-academics also could benefit
greatly from these kinds of measures as well. For example, healthcare providers may be
interested in an individual’s risk-taking propensity when recommending treatments or
preventative care measures. Drug rehabilitation centers could more easily identify individuals at
the highest risk for relapse with an adequate measure of risk taking, and law enforcement or
government officials might more easily target certain individuals or population groups that could
benefit most from crime prevention programs. To create such measures, however, risk-taking
needs to be clearly defined and subsequently operationalized.
Definitions of risk-taking have varied, but a common theme in the literature seems to be
the idea of engaging in behaviors or decisions that involve multiple possible outcomes, some of
which are negative (Slovic, 1964). This broad definition is unfortunately vague and can lead to a
variety of interpretations. For some, risk is only measured as a function of the magnitude and/or
probability of these negative outcomes, with the type of risk being included occasionally as a
moderating factor as well (Gardoni & Murphy, 2014). Indeed, even most dictionary definitions
of risk focus exclusively on potential negative consequences (Carmichael, 2016). Consider the
following two examples: both playing poker and drunk driving would fit the definition given by
Slovic, as both activities involve making decisions that have potentially negative outcomes (e.g.,
losing money, crashing and/or being arrested), yet most people would likely judge drunk driving
1

as being a more risky decision to make, and thus both scenarios also fit the conceptualization
presented by Gardoni and Murphy (as the type of behavior alters the magnitude of the potential
consequences).
This consequence-centered conceptualization seems incomplete, however, as the
likelihood and size of rewards seem to be important factors in risky decision-making as well. For
example, experienced gamblers understand when they have a good chance of winning a round of
their game of choice and can alter their betting based on their perceived chance of success
(Spurrier & Blaszczynski, 2014). Similarly, the likelihood of being arrested or in an accident due
to drunk driving increases with the number of alcoholic drinks imbibed, a fact of which
convicted drunk drivers tend to admit to have had some awareness, resulting in fewer
accidents/arrests for individuals who had consumed a very high number of drinks, as they are
aware of their increased impairment and choose to drive less often than individuals who have
had a medium number of drinks (Phelps, 1987). Individuals who are high in sensation seeking,
impulsivity, and other risk-related personality constructs also tend to overestimate the extent of
potential rewards of risky behaviors (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Ryb, Dischinger, Kufera, &
Read, 2006). Thus, the likelihood of both success and failure, as well as the magnitude of each,
all seem to play a role in the decision to engage in risky behaviors.
These four factors (the separate probabilities of injury and reward, and the separate
magnitude of each) are generally considered to be the key components that affect risky decision
making (though the magnitude and probability of reward are ignored more often than not), and
each are associated with different (though related) neurological and cognitive processes (Ernst &
Paulus, 2005; Smith et al., 2009). Despite the prevalence of this knowledge in the neuroscientific
literature, little is done to operationalize these factors within behavioral assessments of risk2

taking in psychological studies. Indeed, while current behavioral tasks correlate with real-world
risky behaviors broadly, they have not been decomposed into these more fundamental factors
that influence the decision to engage in such behaviors, making study of the underlying cognitive
or neurological processes of risky decision making difficult, if not impossible (Schonberg, Fox,
& Poldrack, 2011). There is thus a strong need for better, more complex behavioral tasks that can
both predict real risky behaviors and precisely examine the effects of these underlying factors on
risky decision making.
Finally, while these four factors may underlie risky decision making, one must also
consider how these factors interact with different risky behaviors, as the strength and extent of
the effects of these factors on risk-taking may vary between specific risky behaviors. For
example, the magnitude of reward is likely to play a larger role in behaviors such as gambling,
where individuals are tempted to risk losing more money for the chance to win a large sum. In
contrast, an intoxicated individual may be more concerned with the likelihood of being caught or
crashing their vehicle (i.e., injury probability) if they were to attempt to drive. Thus, new
behavioral tasks should also cover conceptually distinct types of risky behavior in order to better
illustrate how the effect sizes of these factors tend to vary. Therefore, a good behavioral task
should examine a total of five factors that may be impacting scores: the effects of the four
underlying influences on decision-making, plus the effects of the specific risky behavior being
examined.
The subsequent review of the various existing risk-taking measures is focused on briefly
examining how currently available measures fall short in their ability to examine these more
precise factors, as well as other weaknesses related to the assessment of risk-taking. The details
of the current study are then discussed. The study primarily sought to establish a new behavioral
3

measure that is centered around these four factors and covers multiple examples of risky
behaviors.
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Literature Review
Self-Report Measures of Risk Taking
Before examining behavioral measures of risk-taking, a brief review of self-report
measures is necessary, as they are more frequently used in studies and are often the metric (in
addition to actual risk-taking behavior) used to evaluate the construct validity of behavioral
tasks. The two selected for review here are among the most commonly cited and therefore
provide a fair approximation of how most researchers conceptualize and assess risk-taking.
One of the most popular self-report risk-taking measures is the Domain Specific RiskTaking Scale (DOSPERT), which assesses reported levels of risk taking in 5 domain areas:
ethical, financial, health and safety, social, and recreational (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). In
addition to the usual assessment of actual engagement in risk behaviors, DOSPERT also
examines participants’ perceived-risk attitudes in each of these domains, which the authors
defined as a participant’s willingness to engage in a given activity as a function of the perceived
level of risk in that activity.
DOSPERT has good internal consistency and moderate test-retest reliability, and its
factor structure has been replicated in a variety of settings and populations (Blais & Weber,
2006; Weber et al., 2002). The construct validity of DOSPERT risk domains is also high (Blais
& Weber, 2006; Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006). Not only do scale scores correlate to relevant
past and present risk behaviors (i.e., someone with high scores on the financial scale has indeed
made frequent risky financial decisions in the past or present), but the scale scores do not
automatically generalize across domains (e.g., a high score on the recreational scale does not
necessarily predict high scores on the financial scale). Additionally, because of its ability to
assess multiple types of everyday risk taking and its dual focus on both perceived risk attitudes
5

and actual risk behaviors, DOSPERT has been commended in a systematic review as one of the
most relevant and useful risk taking scales for use in clinical environments (Harrison, Young,
Butow, Salkeld, & Solomon, 2005).
DOSPERT also seems to assess a few of the five factors of risky decision-making as
well. Unlike most risk-taking measures (self-report and behavioral), DOSPERT does assess
multiple types of risky behavior as well as risk perception. However, while the risk-perception
scales seem to assess the injury magnitude element of risky decision making, DOSPERT does
not assess any of the other factors (i.e., injury probability, reward magnitude, reward probability)
in its scales. Thus, while this is not necessarily an issue with DOSPERT itself (as self-report
measures generally measure a specific construct or constructs, which is in this case are risktaking and risk perception, and not the factors that influence them), the use of DOSPERT as a
gold standard to compare against new behavioral tasks may be inappropriate if such tasks do
indeed decompose risk-taking into a function of these factors, as there is only overlap between a
few of these factors and the DOSPERT scales.
Despite the rise of more contemporary measures, the Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS;
Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978) has also remained a popular self-report measure for
researchers studying risk taking. While not technically a measure of risk-taking itself, SSS
examines the personality construct of sensation seeking, which is related to risk taking by its own
definition: “A trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and
experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of
such experience” (Deditius-Island & Caruso, 2002; Zuckerman, 1994). The fifth version of SSS
(SSS-V) breaks down this construct into four factor scales (Zuckerman et al., 1978): thrill and
adventure seeking (whose items reflect a desire to engage in high risk sports like skydiving or
6

mountain climbing), experience seeking (whose items relate to a desire for novel sensory or
mental experiences), disinhibition (whose items express the respondent’s desire to engage in
commonly studied risk behaviors such as drug use and reckless sex), and boredom susceptibility
(which assesses aversion to repetitious or routine behaviors/lifestyles).
Despite its popularity over the years, the psychometric data on SSS-V is mixed. A
systematic review of each factor scale’s reliability found that the boredom susceptibility scale
consistently failed to meet reliability standards (as assessed by Cronbach’s α) across hundreds of
studies, while the other three scales had borderline (though still acceptable) reliabilities on
average (Deditius-Island & Caruso, 2002). Despite this weakness, however, numerous studies
support the overall construct validity, convergent validity, and factor structure of SSS-V
(Roberti, Storch, & Bravata, 2003; Zuckerman, 1994). The largest criticism of the measure is
instead usually its use of antiquated jargon in many of its items (Arnett, 1994). For example, few
young adults today will understand what the term “jet set” means. While the author has
acknowledged this issue and even published revised versions of some items (Zuckerman, 1996,
2007), many contest that further edits are still needed to maintain the scale’s validity in
contemporary use. Specifically, some have suggested that the items that involve activities that
many no longer consider particularly risky or exotic, such as marijuana use or non-traditional
sexual practices, require updating (Gray & Wilson, 2007).
Even if the SSS-V did not have the reliability or content/wording problems it seems to
have, the measure would still be an inappropriate metric against which to compare a behavioral
task when examining such a task’s construct validity. Unlike DOSPERT, which measures actual
risky behaviors and risk-perception, SSS-V primarily measures sensation seeking, a personality
construct that, while perhaps conceptually related to risk-taking, is certainly not equivalent to it.
7

While personality researchers may find this measure to be of interest, it would be inappropriate
to use this measure as a self-report measure of risk-taking, yet researchers have continually used
SSS-V to test the convergent validity of behavioral risk-taking tasks (Lejuez et al., 2002; Wardle,
Gonzalez, Bechara, & Martin-Thormeyer, 2010). This issue likely has led to erroneous
conclusions about the construct validity of existing behavioral measures, which may help explain
why behavioral tasks tend to have lower correlations than expected with better risk-taking
measures like DOSPERT (Buelow & Blaine, 2015; Hopko et al., 2006; Upton, Bishara, Ahn, &
Stout, 2011). While addressing this issue was beyond the scope of the current study, this problem
underscores the need for higher quality measures of risk-taking in general, both in the self-report
and behavioral domains.
Behavioral Measures of Risk
Behavioral tasks to measure risk-taking are meant to be an alternate form of
assessment, in that they enable researchers to observe a standardized example of an individual’s
actual risk-taking behavior instead of having to rely on retrospective self-report. One of the most
popular behavioral measures is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), a computerized task in
which participants earn imaginary money by continually inflating a virtual balloon (Lejuez et al.,
2002). Participants may stop inflating a balloon at any time to “bank” their current earnings and
start a new balloon trial. Successive pumps increase the risk of the balloon exploding, however,
in which case the participant loses any earnings from that trial.
The original authors of the task found several significant correlations between
BART risk-taking scores and other measures of risk-related constructs. These included selfreport measures of behavioral constraint (which had a negative association with BART risk
taking), impulsivity (positive), and sensation seeking (positive). The original researchers also
8

found that BART risk-taking scores had positive associations with substance use and delinquent
behavior in the past year (Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005; Lejuez et al.,
2002). BART scores were able to differentiate between smokers and non-smokers, as well as
cocaine users/non-users (Bornovalova, Daughters, Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005;
Lejuez, Aklin, Jones, et al., 2003). These findings replicated in adolescent and clinical samples
(Hopko et al., 2006; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003). The test-retest reliability of
BART scores was also shown to be acceptable, r(37) = .77, p < .001 (White, Lejuez, & de Wit,
2008). Due to this initial strong body of evidence, BART became very popular, as it apparently
lacked many of the weaknesses found in previous behavioral tasks designed to assess risk taking,
as evidenced by its significant correlations with self-report measures of risk taking (Lejuez et al.,
2002). It thus even began to be used in subfields outside of personality or risk assessment, such
as in cognitive neuroscience in conjunction with fMRI (Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, Hoang, &
Detre, 2008).
More recent evidence from other researchers, however, have called many of these
findings into question. A recent meta-analysis indicated that the overall effect size for the
relationship of BART scores with self-report measures of risk-taking across nearly two dozen
studies was rather small (r = .14; (Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2014). Even in subfields
such as personality, this correlation size is considered unimpressive and hardly noteworthy.
Thus, the current evidence suggests that the relationship of BART to self-report measures of
risk-taking may not be as impressive as was originally thought.
Newer findings have also criticized the BART’s supposed relationship to real-world
risky behaviors. Studies conducted without the involvement of the BART authors found that
there was no significant relationship between BART scores and smoking or drinking, and that
9

there were no differences in BART scores between users and non-users of tobacco or alcohol.
Furthermore, the BART has been shown to have no significant association with other behavioral
measures of risk taking (Buelow & Blaine, 2015). This last point highlights a persistent issue
with different behavioral risk-taking measures, in that they appear to be measuring differing riskrelated constructs, instead of acting as comprehensive measures of the elements of risk-taking
(Aklin et al., 2005).
Regarding how well BART manipulates the elements of risky decision making, the task
certainly manipulates the probability of injury as part of the task (as the likelihood of the balloon
popping increases with each pump, and the starting probability varies between trials in most
versions of the test), but it does nothing to manipulate any of the other factors that influence
risky decision making. The amount of “money” earned with each pump does not vary within or
across trials, and the probability of earning money on a pump is simply the inverse of the
probability of the balloon popping (i.e., there is no neutral outcome where money is neither
earned or lost, thus making the probabilities of reward and injury two ways of looking at the
same variable). One might argue that the magnitude of reward does vary, as it increases with
each successive pump in a trial, but this makes it manipulated by the participant rather than the
experimenter, and thus is not truly an independent variable. Furthermore, the injury probability
condition is almost never even utilized in analyses of BART, with scores being typically reported
as average earnings across trials or average pumps per trial, rather than being broken down into
scores organized by the different levels of the initial popping probability (Lauriola et al., 2014;
Lejuez et al., 2002). While this limited form of analysis may be sufficient for personality or
clinical studies, BART in its current form is difficult to utilize effectively in studies examining
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cognitive processes or brain activity, studies which need a means of parsing scores along the
lines of these other elements of risky decision making (Schonberg et al., 2011).
Another popular behavioral risk-taking task is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT;
Antoine Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). The task was originally intended to
examine decision-making deficits in brain-damaged populations, but has since seen use in a
variety of research subfields, including personality and risk-taking (Xu, Korczykowski, Zhu, &
Rao, 2013). In the IGT, participants select a total of 100 cards by choosing from 4 decks, with no
more than 60 cards being allowed to come from the same deck. Each card gives or takes away a
certain amount of “money” to the participant. The decks are arranged such that two give an
overall net positive gain (advantageous) but lower individual “win” values, while the other two
give an overall net loss (disadvantageous) but with larger individual “win” values (Bechara,
2007). Scores for decision making are calculated by subtracting the number of choices from
disadvantageous decks from the number of choices made from advantageous decks. Healthy
individuals generally are able to figure out that the advantageous decks are better in the long run,
while neurologically impaired individuals typically are unable to recognize this over the course
of the task (Antoine Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000).
Despite there being evidence for the construct validity of IGT’s original purpose
(assessing decision-making deficits in clinical populations), there are a number of issues
regarding its utility for other purposes (Buelow & Suhr, 2009). For example, while IGT
performance has been shown to be impacted negatively by cocaine and marijuana use (compared
to abstinent controls), there were significant learning effects that occur in all individuals,
regardless of substance use (Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007). While these effects are expected, if not
part of the task design itself, participants have demonstrated the ability to become consciously
11

aware of these effects after only one completion of the task and can explicitly describe that some
decks are better than others in the long run, thereby making retesting far less valid than the initial
run (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005). Additionally, healthy individuals also
typically show this reversal learning effect midway through the task, at which point they
recognize that the disadvantageous decks are negatively impacting their overall performance
(despite their larger “win” amounts) and consciously switch to the net positive, but smaller
rewarding, advantageous decks (Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004). This learning effect (or lack
thereof, in the case of neurologically impaired individuals) has thus been hypothesized to be the
cause of group differences in IGT performance, as opposed to differences in risk-taking
propensity (Maia & McClelland, 2004).
Some have used this idea to argue that the IGT does not actually assess risk-taking at all,
instead assessing only an individual’s learning abilities, and by extension how different variables
(e.g., substance use, neurological functioning, personality) affect this ability (Buelow & Suhr,
2009). Indeed, newer evidence has suggested that IGT performance might be only partially
indicative of propensity for risk taking, and even then only in individuals who are both low in
trait impulsivity and are able to show the reversal learning effect midway through the task
(Upton et al., 2011). This directly contradicts previous theories about how the IGT measures
risk-taking, as it was thought that individuals more prone to risky behavior and impulsiveness
would fail to show the learning effect and continue drawing from the disadvantageous decks (A.
Bechara et al., 2005).
Like the BART, IGT does not seem to correlate strongly (if at all) with other measures of
risk taking (Buelow & Suhr, 2009; Lejuez, Aklin, Jones, et al., 2003; Upton et al., 2011). This
supports the notion that these tasks are likely examining different aspects of decision making
12

(Buelow & Blaine, 2015). With respect to its manipulation of the various elements of risk, the
four decks in the task actually do have varying magnitudes of both rewards and penalties, as well
as differing reward and penalty probabilities (Bechara, 2007). However, as with BART, the
effects of each of these factors are rarely (if ever) part of analyses of task performance.
Examining each of their effects individually would be difficult anyway, as the task is essentially
one very long trial, with the variations in each of these factors being controlled by the participant
(via the deck they choose for each of their 100 selections) and not the experimenter directly.
Thus, IGT is difficult to use in cognitive neuroscience studies that wish to examine the cognitive
processes underlying risky behavior. To be fair to the authors, this was not the intended purpose
of the task, and thus this limitation does not make IGT a bad measure of risk-taking per se. As
with BART, the task is simply unsuitable for studies trying to examine the precise cognitive
constructs influencing risky behavior (Schonberg et al., 2011).
Few other behavioral tasks seem to explicitly assess the underlying elements of risktaking. Some newer tasks, such as the Columbia Card Task (CCT), show promise, but their
validity and relationship to self-report measures of risk taking and other relevant variables is not
yet established, and their relationship to BART and IGT has been shown to be non-significant
(Buelow & Blaine, 2015; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). There is consequently
a need in the field of cognitive neuroscience for specialized behavioral tasks that not only assess
the different cognitive constructs that comprise risky decision making, but that also show
appropriate correlations with self-report measures of risk-related constructs, as well as real-world
risky behaviors. Such tasks should also assess a variety of risk-taking behaviors, as using only a
single type of task inhibits the generalizability of any effects of these factors on risky behavior.
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The present study attempted to provide a bridge to this gap in the literature by
introducing a new, more specialized type of behavioral task that incorporates imagery of actual
physically risky activities, as opposed to a novel game that does not have a real-world equivalent
(such as selecting cards or pumping up balloons for money). While no measure of risk-taking can
truly simulate most risk-taking behaviors, especially those that risk physical injury, the hope was
that at least reflecting multiple real-world behaviors in a task would more accurately and reliably
predict real-world risk-taking, as well as correlate better with other measures of risk-taking and
risk-related constructs.
Assessment of Physical Risk Taking (APRT)
APRT is a computerized task in which participants complete 64 unique trials. Each trial
involves the participant viewing a picture that depicts a first-person view of a physically
dangerous activity from one of four categories (encountering a dangerous animal, attempting to
photograph natural disasters, attempting to help someone in physical danger, and standing on the
edge of a high ledge or cliff). While these are not exactly everyday behaviors, they are still
intended to represent real-world activities in which an individual high in physical risk-taking
propensity may engage when the opportunity presents itself. At the start of the trial, the picture is
accompanied by text along the top of the screen describing what the participant is “doing” (e.g.,
“You are attempting to photograph natural disasters” would accompany a picture of a tornado).
The screen also shows the participant’s current health and points scores for that trial; each trial
begins at 100 health and 0 points.
During each trial, participants choose whether or not to proceed with the displayed
activity to try and earn points. Choosing to proceed (by pressing the “p” key on a standard
keyboard) results in either gaining points and a reward message that replaces the initial activity
14

description (“Lucky You – Points Awarded!”), gaining no points but also not losing health
(“Sorry, no points awarded”), or losing both points and health (“Oh no! You have been injured –
choose again”). The condition with no change in points was implemented to further distinguish
the differing probabilities of rewards and injuries, as opposed to tasks like BART where one is
simply the inverse of the other (Lejuez et al., 2002). If the participant’s health drops to zero as a
result of a press, they are presented with a “death” screen, in which the entire screen changes to
only display the following message: “You have died. You have lost all of your points for this
trial. Please wait for a few seconds while the computer resets for the next trial.” Choosing to quit
the current trial (by pressing the “q” key) allows the participants to save all their current points
and safely end the current “activity”, automatically proceeding to the next trial (with a new
picture, text description, and reset health and points). Figure 1 shows an example of how a trial
may go for the participant, showing a few of the possible outcomes of each “p” press.

Figure 1. Example of an APRT trial

The probabilities of reward or injury, as well as the relative ranges of possible rewards
and injuries, are randomly assigned to each trial but are consistent throughout a trial.
15

Additionally, respondents are (accurately) informed that the border pattern surrounding each trial
picture indicates the general reward probability of that trial (solid = high reward probability,
striped = low reward probability), while the color of the border indicates the injury probability
(blue = low risk of injury, yellow = high risk of injury). This is done to protect the task from
learning effects present in other behavioral measures of risk taking, such as the IGT (Maia &
McClelland, 2004). By informing the participants of some of the manipulations of each trial,
there is less of an ability for some participants to “figure out” the task and use that knowledge to
their advantage where an unaware participant could not, therefore making their behavior during
the task more indicative of their actual risk-taking propensity, rather than their ability to learn or
adapt to the task. Furthermore, neurobiological research has shown that there is stronger
activation of brain areas associated with risk perception when the probability of injury and/or
reward are somehow indicated compared to when the probabilities are left ambiguous (Burke &
Tobler, 2011). Thus, participants would hopefully take these probabilities more seriously when
making decisions in the task than if they had to infer them from their own performance.
Participants are not, however, given any information about the severity of rewards or injuries in
each trial (i.e., how many points/health they could win or lose from a single press). Though they
could technically determine this from closely watching how their scores change with each press,
it was never explicitly explained to them. Table 1 summarizes the exact probabilities for the
different reward and injury conditions, as well as the different ranges of health/points lost per
injury and points gained per reward.
As part of the instructions explaining the task, participants are shown previous high
scores of other individuals who have completed APRT (which are real scores taken from early
pilot studies using a prototype of APRT). They are also told that their total score will be shown
16

to them at the very end of all trials, and that they should try to earn as many points as possible.
The participants are also given four practice trials (one from each picture category) to become
accustomed to the task before the actual 64 trials begin. Additionally, for this study specifically,
half of the participants were assigned to a 1500ms delay condition that slows the speed at which
the points and health are updated (the delay occurs after the key press and before the updated
health and points scores are displayed), during which they are unable to continue to their next
key press decision (as opposed to the non-delay condition, which updates and allows the next
press instantaneously). The introduction of delays during risk-taking tasks, such as card games,
has been previously shown to reduce maladaptive preservations in task behavior in participants
with personality traits related to high levels of risk taking (Newman, Patterson, & Kosson, 1987).
I therefore examined whether a delay would also impact APRT performance, regardless of
personality. Additionally, studies using psychophysiological measurements, such as an
electroencephalogram (EEG), require short delays between recorded responses in order to
properly capture event-related potentials (ERP). Thus, I had also wished to know whether a delay
in future psychophysiological studies that used APRT waslikely to result in different effects for
the various manipulations on participant scores than those observed when no delay was present.
There are four outcomes scores derived from APRT performance: average total Points
across all trials, average number of Go (“p”) Presses across all trials, points acquired per injury
sustained, average Injuries per trial, and average Remaining Health after each trial. Lastly, the
within-subject factors of APRT are Picture Type (animal, heroism, natural disaster, and cliff),
Reward Probability (low/high), Reward Amount (low/high), Injury Probability (low/high), and
Injury Amount (low/high), which are designed to represent the underlying elements of risk. The
only between-subject factor for this study was the Delay condition.
17

Aims of the Study
The primary aim of the study was to introduce and explore the independent variabledependent variable relationships of a new behavioral measure of risk-taking, the Assessment of
Physical Risk Taking (APRT). Unlike existing behavioral tasks, APRT was designed to assess
specific aspects of risk taking that might affect decision-making (e.g., probability and magnitude
of rewards and punishments), as opposed to using a much more general, unspecified
operationalization of risk-taking as other behavioral measures do.
Because of the multitude of both independent and dependent variables within APRT,
there are an extremely high number of predictions and research questions that might have been
answered using the measure by itself, to say nothing of the plethora of potential relationships
between APRT variables and other risk-taking measures. Rather than produce an excessive
number of hypotheses that cover every possible relationship between each of the APRT
variables, I instead chose to focus on a select few questions that I felt would provide the
strongest evidence for APRT’s utility as a behavioral measure of physical risk-taking. They were
as follows:
Q1: Do the severity of penalties, frequency of such penalties, extent of rewards,
frequency of rewards, and type of displayed activity all independently impact an individual’s
performance in a simulation task designed to assess that person’s propensity to engage in similar,
real-world physically risky activities?
Q2: Does the inclusion of a momentary delay in such a task affect the relationship
between any of the aforementioned variables and an individual’s performance in the game?
Q3: Do any of the variables in Q1 interact with each other to alter relationships these
variables have to performance in this task?
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Earlier pilot studies that utilized older versions of APRT also sought to answer these
questions, and while I updated and altered several features of APRT for the present study, I still
wished to replicate some of the more interesting and notable findings from those studies. With
both the research questions and prior data in mind, my hypotheses for this study were as follows:
H1: Main effects for all five within-subjects independent variables would be observed
for all 4 dependent variables (Points, Injuries, Remaining Health, and Go Presses). The Reward
Amount condition was of particular interest, as the difference between the low and high
condition point ranges was increased from previous pilot studies to be an entire order of
magnitude greater, in order to better contrast the potential outcome differences between the two
conditions of this variable, as the original difference in ranges was apparently too small to result
in any observable effect (see Table 1 for the exact values used in this study). Additionally, three
of the Picture Type categories had also been changed from previous iterations of APRT (the cliff
pictures being the only preserved category), to better reflect conceptually different, but still realworld risk behaviors. Thus, I expected there to be strong main effects for this condition and the
Reward Amount condition.
H2a: The Delay variable (the only between-subject manipulation) was expected to show
significant interactions with several of the other independent variables across many of the
dependent variables. Specifically, prior research suggests that an instituted delay can cause
decreased perseveration in maladaptive response patterns (Newman et al., 1987), so I expected
that the participants in the delay condition would exhibit decreased participation (as measured by
Go Presses), as well as lower averages for Points and Injuries, in trials programmed with either
high Injury Amount or high Injury Probability compared to trials with the “low” settings for
these conditions. The disparity between the high and low conditions for these outcomes (Points,
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Injuries, and Go presses) was expected to be greater for delayed participants than non-delayed
participants, as the former were forced to stop and consider their decision for an additional
moment and may potentially have recognized the greater risk of injury (or severity of injury) in
some trials, while the latter were free to act impulsively and immediately if they so wished.
H2b: I expected that Delay would also interact significantly with Picture Type. Prior
analyses on earlier versions of APRT found that the extent to which the different picture
categories affected the average number of Points, Go Presses, and Remaining Health was
dependent on whether or not the delay was present, with the presence of the delay usually
decreasing the average value of Points, Go Presses, and Health, while also increasing the
difference in averages between the picture categories. Forcing some participants to pause and
consider their actions seems to have resulted in decreased participation in the task during trials
displaying certain (but not all) types of pictures compared to the same trials in non-delayed
participants. Because the replacement of three of the picture categories in this update of the
APRT was designed to increase the conceptual differences between the categories, I expected a
similar, if not stronger, interaction to arise. Specifically, the Picture Types involving actions
related to another entity (the hero and animal conditions) should have been more impacted by the
Delay (with respect to average Points, Go Presses, and Remaining Health) than more neutral
picture types, where an additional moment of consideration was less likely to affect decisionmaking (i.e., the cliff and disaster photography conditions). Decision-making when another
entity is present is inherently more complex than when the individual is alone, and thus
additional time to consider the former type of situation was presumably more likely to result in
changes to an individual’s behavior in those situations compared to the latter, where additional
consideration time will likely not change the individual’s ultimate decision.
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H3a: I anticipated that for the Points outcome, the effect of Reward Amount would
differ depending on the level of Injury Amount, with the difference in points earned between
high and low Reward Amount trials being greater during trials that also have the low Injury
Amount condition, as participants would have been able to capitalize on the reduced injury
during high Reward Amount trials and quickly attain much higher scores than during high Injury
Amount trials. The risk of losing more health (and potentially all points if they die) would likely
result in lower Go Presses (and therefore fewer chances to earn points) in those trials, which
would consequently make the difference between high and low Reward Amount trial Points
much smaller. The new changes to the Reward Amount conditions would likely result in this
interaction occurring.
H3b: I also predicted interactions between Picture Type and Injury Amount, as well as
Picture Type and Injury Probability. As stated previously, the new picture categories were
intended to represent a wider range of physically risky behaviors, and therefore the increased
severity or chance of being harmed during these activities (i.e., in the high condition of Injury
Amount/Probability) may have been more apparent to participants in some of the picture types
versus others. Specifically, I expected the animal pictures with high Injury Amount or high
Injury Probability to result in lower scores for the Points, Injuries, and Go Presses outcomes
compared to animal pictures with low Injury Amount/Probability. The participants were likely to
assume the more severe or more frequent injuries received during the former were the result of
the particular animal they are encountering being more dangerous than others (i.e., those animals
displayed during low Injury Amount/Probability trials) and would have therefore quickly moved
on from these trials, resulting in fewer Points, Injuries, and Go Presses. I predicted Remaining
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Health would be higher in these high-risk animal trials, as engaging in the task less would (on
average) result in fewer lost points and health.
I did not expect to see a similar effect for the cliff and natural disaster photography
categories, however, as these pictures do not involve an agent creating danger for the player nor
are the pictures as varied in content, so participants were probably less likely to attribute noticed
differences in injury frequency/amount to the situation depicted by the particular trial picture in
these categories. They were thus less likely to change their playstyle as radically as I believed
they would in the high-risk animal trials. Finally, for the heroic picture I category I anticipated
that high Injury Probability would not differ significantly from its low counterpart on any of the
outcome scores, but that high Injury Amount trials would result in fewer Points, Go Presses, and
Injuries than low Injury Amount trials in this picture category. This was due to the altruistic
nature of the category (trying to save someone from danger) likely causing the majority of
participants to be willing to risk acquiring a few additional smaller injuries for the sake of the
“person” in danger, but more severe injuries resulting in greater hesitancy to continue to engage
in the task (i.e., few would risk death to save a stranger from danger).
H3c. There would be a significant interaction between Injury Probability and Reward
Probability (the only dichotomous independent variables fully visible to the participant in each
trial) for all four outcome variables. Because the conditions (low/high) of these variables are
both indicated by the border of each trial’s picture, participants would likely use this information
to adjust their playstyle. Low Injury Probability and high Reward Probability would result in
greater participation and success in those trials (resulting in higher Points, Go Presses, and
Remaining Health, in addition to fewer Injuries), while high Injury Probability and low Reward
Probability trials would result in little time spent on those trials (resulting in fewer Points, Go
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Presses, and Injuries, along with greater Remaining Health). Trials in which both variables are
high or low would likely result in the variables cancelling the other’s effects out, resulting in
outcome scores that are roughly in between those obtained in the other two types of trial
combinations for these variables.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 256 students recruited through the psychology subject pool at
UNLV. They received class credit as compensation. The sample was 71% female and had a
mean age of 19.71 (SD = 3.03, Range = 18-42). The racial and ethnic distribution for the sample
was: 40.1% Caucasian, 38.5% Asian, 13.9% African-American, 6.4% Pacific Islander, 1.2%
Native American, and 9.9% choosing not to provide information regarding their race, with
35.7% of participants also identifying as Hispanic. A pre-hoc power analysis revealed that, in
order to observe the smallest significant main effect size found in an earlier pilot study (d =
0.167) at the recommended power level of .80, a sample size of 281 would have been required.
However, the next smallest main effect size (d = 0.232) only required a sample of 202. Thus, I
had a sufficiently powered sample to detect effects of similar size to the pilot study, except for
the very smallest effect from that sample.
Procedure
Participants completed APRT on computers located in the UNLV
Psychophysiology of Emotion and Personality (PEP) Lab as part of a larger study on personality
and behavior. The task was programmed in PsychoPy and the trials were counterbalanced across
all 5 independent variables. Each participant was assigned a subject number, with evennumbered subjects being placed into the Delay condition. Their completion of the study was
overseen by a trained research assistant, who sat them at one of five lab computers and give each
participant the opportunity to ask questions whilst undergoing the consent process. All
participants received a verbal debriefing once the study procedure was complete.
Analyses
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Main Effects and Interactions. To model the effects of the independent variables on the
four different dependent variables, a series of generalized estimating equations (GEEs) were
utilized. GEEs are an alternative to Generalized Linear Models that allow for correlations among
the observations (such as those present in repeated measure tasks such as APRT) and do not need
to meet the same assumptions about the distribution of the variables or residuals that traditional
linear regression models do, while still providing robust and unbiased estimates of the standard
errors for the estimated coefficients (Burton, Gurrin, & Sly, 1998; Hanley, Negassa, Edwardes,
& Forrester, 2003). A separate GEE was created for each dependent variable to model the main
effects and interactions of the 6 independent variables. All main effects, two-way interactions
among the 5 within-subject factors, and interactions between within-subject factors and Delay
(the sole between-subject factor) were estimated assuming an unstructured estimated covariance
matrix (i.e., a specific pattern was not assumed for the relationships between observations, a
method which results in more robust standard errors but slightly less statistical power). Due to
heavy skew in the dependent variables, a log transformation was performed prior to running each
GEE. While this was not technically required to run the GEEs properly, it helped retain some of
the statistical power that would have been otherwise lost from assuming the unstructured
covariance matrix.
Statistically significant main effects for Picture Type and interactions were decomposed
using post hoc pairwise comparisons utilizing a sequential-Sidak (also known as Holm-Sidak)
correction to control for multiple comparisons. This method resembles a sequential Bonferroni
correction in method but employs a more complex formula to determine the critical α for each
comparison, in addition to assuming the comparisons are independent of each other (Holm,
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1979). A starting critical α of .05 was used for all analyses, and all analyses were conducted in
SPSS.
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Results
Generalized Estimating Equations
The results of the GEEs are summarized in Table 2. Significant main effects and
interactions are explored in detail below. Table 3 summarizes the relevant means, standard
errors, and Wald χ2 values for all statistically significant interactions. Figures 2 through 4
illustrate a few of the most important (and largest) interaction effects that emerged from the data.
These types of interactions form the basis of the subsequent discussion of how APRT seems to
be assessing risk-taking. Figure 2 shows how the slopes in both conditions are discernible and
that the slope in one condition is discernibly greater than that in another condition. Figure 3
displays an interaction in which there is no discernible slope between two levels of one factor in
one condition but there is a discernible slope in the other. Figure 4 demonstrates how slopes of
one factor are in opposite directions based on levels of another factor.
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Figure 3. Two-way interaction between Injury Magnitude and Picture Category
(Disaster-Hero) on APRT Go Presses score.
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Figure 4. Two-way interaction between Reward Magnitude and Reward Probability on
APRT Go Presses score.

Points.
Main Effects. There was a main effect for Picture Type. The Hero condition
resulted in the largest number of Points earned on average (M = 114.23, SE = 5.42), which was
significantly greater than the other three conditions. The Animal condition resulted in the lowest
number of Points on average (M = 69.09, SE = 5.42), which was significantly lower than all the
other conditions. The average Points earned during Cliff (M = 95.28, SE = 5.11) and Disaster (M
= 100.94, SE = 5.70) trials did not significantly differ, however.
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Participants earned more Points in low Injury Magnitude trials (M = 143.53, SE = 7.62)
than in high Injury Magnitude trials (M = 60.70, SE = 2.84) and in low Injury Probability trials
(M = 169.19, SE = 8.24) than in high Injury Probability trials. They also earned more Points in
high Reward Magnitude trials (M = 292.98, SE = 13.34) than in low Reward Magnitude trials (M
= 29.74, SE = 1.44) and in high Reward Probability trials (M = 124.80, SE = 5.66) than in low
Reward Probability trials (M = 69.08, SE = 3.47). After correcting for multiple comparisons,
there was no main effect of Delay on Points.
Within-subject interactions. There was a Picture Type x Injury Probability
interaction,. There was no difference in average Points per trial between Disaster and Hero trials
when Injury Probability was low, but when Injury Probability was high, Hero trials resulted in
higher Points scores on average compared to Disaster trials. Additionally, the increase in Points
going from the Animal to the Cliff trials was slightly sharper when Injury Probability was high
compared to when it was low.
There was an Injury Magnitude x Reward Magnitude interaction. When Reward
Magnitude was high, the decrease in average Points per trial going from the low Injury
Magnitude to the high Injury Magnitude condition was substantially sharper compared to when
Reward Magnitude was low.
There was an Injury Magnitude x Injury Probability interaction. When Injury Probability
was low, the decrease in average Points going from the low Injury Magnitude condition to the
high Injury Magnitude condition was slightly sharper compared to when Injury Probability was
high.
There was a Reward Magnitude x Injury Probability interaction. When Reward
Magnitude was high, the decrease in average Points going from the low Injury Probability
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condition to the high Injury Probability condition was substantially sharper compared to when it
was low.
Finally, there was an Injury Probability x Reward Probability interaction. When
Injury Probability was low, the increase in average Points going from the low Reward
Probability condition to the high Reward Probability condition was slightly sharper compared to
when it was high. No other significant within-subject interactions for Points were observed.
Interactions involving Delay. After correcting for multiple comparisons, no
significant interactions involving Delay were observed.
Go Presses.
Main Effects. There was a main effect for Picture Type. All picture categories had
significantly different Go Presses from each other. The Hero condition had the most Go Presses
on average (M = 5.98, SE = 0.27), followed by Disaster (M = 5.31, SE = 0.27), Cliff (M = 4.85,
SE = 0.24), and Animal (M = 4.05, SE = 0.26).
Participants made more Go Presses in low Injury Magnitude trials (M = 6.55, SE = 0.35)
than in high Injury Magnitude trials (M = 3.81, SE = 0.17) and in low Injury Probability trials (M
= 7.36, SE = 0.38) than in high Injury Probability trials (M = 3.40, SE = 0.16). Participants also
made more Go Presses in low Reward Magnitude trials (M = 5.23, SE = 0.25) than in high
Reward Magnitude trials (M = 4.78, SE = 0.24). Finally, participants who were given the forced
delay between responses had fewer Go Presses (M = 4.35, SE = 0.29) on average than
participants that were not delayed (M = 5.75, SE = 0.39). After correcting for multiple
comparisons, there was no main effect for Reward Probability.
Within-subject interactions. There was a Picture Type x Injury Magnitude interaction.
There was no significant difference in Go Presses between Disaster and Hero trials when Injury
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Magnitude was low, but when Injury Magnitude was high, Hero trials resulted in significantly
more Go Presses compared to Disaster trials. Additionally, when Injury Magnitude was high, the
increase in Go Presses when going from Animal trials to Cliff trials was slightly sharper
compared to when it was low.
There was a Picture Type x Injury Probability interaction. When Injury Probability was
low, there was no difference in Go Presses between Disaster and Hero trials, but Hero trials
resulted in significantly more Go Presses compared to Disaster trials when Injury Probability
was high. Additionally, when Injury Probability was low, the increase in Go Presses going from
Animal to Cliff trials was slightly sharper compared to when it was high.
There was an Injury Magnitude x Injury Probability interaction. When Injury Probability
was low, the decrease in Go Presses going from the low Injury Magnitude to the high Injury
Magnitude condition was slightly sharper compared to when it was high.
Finally, there was a Reward Magnitude x Reward Probability interaction. When
Reward Probability was high, there was no difference in Go Presses between the low and high
Reward Magnitude conditions, but high Reward Magnitude trials resulted in significantly fewer
Go Presses compared to low Reward Magnitude trials when Reward Probability was low.
Interactions involving Delay. After correcting for multiple comparisons, no significant
interactions involving Delay were observed for Go Presses.
Remaining Health.
Main Effects. There was a main effect for Picture Type. All picture categories had
significantly different amounts of Remaining Heath from each other on average. Animal trials
had the highest Remaining Health on average (M = 76.41, SE = 1.26), followed by Cliff trials (M
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= 73.26, SE = 1.19), Disaster trials (M = 70.27, SE = 1.31), and lastly Hero trials (M = 67.02, SE
= 1.25).
Participants had higher Remaining Health on average in low Injury Magnitude trials (M =
80, SE = 1.06) than in high Injury Magnitude trials (M = 63.48, SE = 1.33) and in low Injury
Probability trials (M = 75.80, SE = 1.13) than in high Injury Probability trials (M = 67.69, SE =
1.24). Participants also had greater Remaining Health in high Reward Magnitude trials (M =
72.56, SE = 1.16) than in low Reward Magnitude trials (M = 70.92, SE = 1.20) and slightly more
Remaining Health in high Reward Probability trials on average (M = 72.34, SE = 1.17) than in
low Reward Probability trials (M = 71.15, SE = 1.18). Finally, participants who were given the
delay had higher Remaining Health on average (M = 77.87, SE = 1.43) than participants not
given the delay (M = 65.61, SE = 1.82).
Within-subject interactions. There was a Picture Type x Injury Magnitude interaction.
When Injury Magnitude was low, there was no significant difference in average Remaining
Health between Disaster and Hero trials, but Hero trials resulted in significantly lower
Remaining Health scores compared to Disaster trials when Injury Magnitude was high. A similar
effect was observed for the difference between Animal and Cliff trials, wherein when Injury
Magnitude was low, there was no significant difference in Health scores between the two, but
when Injury Magnitude was high, Cliff trials resulted in lower Remaining Health on average
compared to Animal trials.
There was a Picture Type x Reward Magnitude interaction. When Reward
Magnitude was low, there was no significant difference in Remaining Health scores between
Disaster and Hero trials, but when Reward Magnitude was high, Hero trials resulted in
significantly lower Remaining Health scores on average compared to Disaster trials. A similar
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effect was observed for Animal and Cliff trials, wherein there was no significant difference
between them when Reward Magnitude was low, but when Reward Magnitude was high, Cliff
trials resulted in significantly lower Health scores on average compared to Animal trials.
There was a Picture Type x Injury Probability interaction. When Injury Probability
was low, there was no significant difference in Remaining Health scores between Disaster and
Hero trials, but when Injury Probability was high, Hero trials resulted in significantly lower
Health scores on average compared to Disaster trials. Additionally, when Injury Probability was
low, Cliff trials resulted in significantly lower Health scores compared to Animal trials, but there
was no significant difference in scores between Cliff and Animal trials when Injury Probability
was high.
Finally, there was an Injury Magnitude x Injury Probability interaction. When
Injury Magnitude was high, the decrease in Remaining Health score when going from the low
Injury Probability condition to the high Injury Probability condition was slightly sharper
compared to when Injury Magnitude was low.
Interactions involving Delay. There was a Picture Type x Delay interaction. For nondelayed participants, Hero trial Remaining Health scores were not significantly different from
Disaster trial scores, but Hero trials resulted in significantly higher Health scores compared to
Disaster trials in the delayed participants.
Injuries.
Main Effects. There was a main effect for Picture Type. Each picture category differed
significantly from the other three in average Injuries for each trial. Participants had significantly
greater Injuries in low Injury Magnitude trials (M = 0.91, SE = 0.05) than in high Injury
Magnitude trials (M = 0.50, SE = 0.02) and in high Injury Probability trials (M = 0.82, SE = 0.03)
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than in low Injury Probability trials (M = 0.56, SE = 0.03). Participants suffered significantly
more Injuries in low Reward Magnitude trials (M = 0.70, SE = 0.03) than in high Reward
Magnitude trials (M = 0.65, SE = 0.03). There was a main effect for Injury Probability. Finally,
participants that were given the delay had significantly fewer Injuries on average (M = 0.55, SE
= 0.03) than participants that were not given the delay (M = 0.83, SE = 0.05). After controlling
for multiple comparisons, there was no main effect for Reward Probability.
Within-subject interactions. There was a Picture Type x Injury Magnitude interaction.
When Injury Magnitude was low, there was no significant difference in average Injuries per trial
between Disaster and Hero trials, but there were significantly more Injuries during Hero trials
compared to Disaster trials when Injury Magnitude was high. Additionally, the increase in
average Injuries score when going from Animal to Cliff trials was slightly sharper when Injury
Magnitude was high compared to when it was low.
There was a Picture Type x Injury Probability interaction. When Injury Probability
was low, there was no significant difference in Injury score between Disaster and Hero trials, but
Hero trials resulted in significantly more average Injuries compared to Disaster trials when
Injury Probability was high. Additionally, when Injury Probability was low, there was no
significant difference in Injuries score between Animal and Cliff trials, but Cliff trials resulted in
significantly more Injuries on average compared to Animal trials when Injury Probability was
high.
There was a Picture Type x Reward Probability interaction. When Reward
Probability was high, the increase in average Injuries per trial when going from Disaster to Hero
trials was much sharper compared to when Reward Probability was low. Additionally, the
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increase in Injuries score when going from Animal to Cliff trials was also much sharper when
Reward Probability was high compared to when it was low.
Finally, there was a Reward Magnitude x Reward Probability interaction. When
Reward Probability was high, there was no significant difference in Injuries score between the
low and high Reward Magnitude conditions, but high Reward Magnitude trials resulted in
significantly fewer injuries compared to low Reward Magnitude trials when reward Probability
was high.
Interactions involving Delay. There was an Injury Probability x Delay interaction. The
increase in average Injuries score when going from low Injury Probability trials to high Injury
Probability trials was sharper in the delayed participants compared to the non-delayed
participants.
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Discussion
The goal of the present study was to better understand how specific aspects of risk
influenced scores on a new behavioral measure of risk-taking. Results indicate mixed support for
my hypotheses. Table 4 summarizes how the current results compared to my hypotheses. While
there were significant and strong main effects for nearly all the within-subject variables across all
four APRT scores, many of the interactions I anticipated were not statistically significant.
Specifically, the Reward Magnitude x Injury Magnitude and Reward Probability x Injury
Probability interactions were both only significant for Points scores, while all but two of the
anticipated interactions involving Delay were not statistically significant (though there were
significant main effects across all scores except Points). On the other hand, the anticipated
Picture Type x Injury Magnitude and Picture Type x Injury Probability interactions were
significant across all scores, except for Picture Type x Injury Magnitude on Points. Of these
findings, the lack of Delay interactions was most surprising, as while there was a basic difference
in most scores between the delayed and non-delayed participants (i.e., main effects), Delay did
essentially nothing (with two exceptions, see Table 3) to moderate the influence of the other
manipulations on scores. This bodes well for APRT, as it indicates a small delay does not
drastically alter APRT scores or the effects of other variables that influence these scores. This is
essential for study designs that may require short delays between responses, such as studies using
psychophysiological measurements.
As expected, there were also a number of other significant interactions that were not
included in my hypotheses. Most of these were fairly intuitive, such as the significant interaction
between Injury Magnitude and Injury Probability on Points, Go Press, and Remaining Health
scores, which essentially caused each variable to strengthen the main effect of the other (i.e., the
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difference in scores between the low and high conditions of each variable increased when the
other was at the same low or high condition in a given trial). Interestingly, the corresponding
interaction between Reward Magnitude and Reward Probability was only significant for Go
Press and Injury scores, and even then, the effect size was much smaller (as evidenced by the
Wald χ2 values).
The clearest pattern from the GEE results was the superiority of the Injury-related
variables compared to the Reward-related variables. There were more significant interactions
involving Injury Magnitude and Probability than Reward Magnitude and Probability (as shown
in Table 3), and the majority of the Injury-related interactions were larger in effect size than the
majority of the Reward-related interactions. Simply put, Injury Magnitude and Probability seem
to matter much more to participants than Reward Magnitude and Probability when making risky
decisions. This is especially striking when comparing Reward Probability (which had few
significant effects and weak effect sizes for those that were significant) to Injury Probability
(which had the largest number of main effects/interactions and some of the strongest effect sizes
in all four GEE models).
Picture Type fell somewhere between these two variables, having strong main effects but
generally having interactions with only the Injury Magnitude and Probability variables. As
predicted, the difference in Animal and Cliff trial scores tended to increase when either Injury
Magnitude or Injury Probability was high, suggesting increased defensive emotional processing
when faced with a dangerous animal, a response that is consistent with similar findings in studies
on startle blink potentiation that also used pictures of threatening animals as stimuli (Bradley,
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Quevedo, Benning, Gunnar, & Dahl, 2009). Additionally,
the difference in Hero and Disaster trial scores was only significantly different when Injury
38

Probability or Magnitude was high, with all APRT scores being higher (except Health, which is
expected from receiving more injuries) in the Hero condition. These Hero-Disaster interactions
were particularly interesting, as they suggest that participants were more willing to risk harm to
self when the stakes were higher, but only if the risk was related to attempting to help another
person in danger. This is consistent with some of the literature on risk-taking and altruism, which
posits that individuals are more willing to accept higher risks if it is for the sake of aiding another
person (Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007; Wu et al., 2009).
The overall pattern of results across each of the APRT scores seems to suggest that the
task assesses risk-taking in a manner different to that of other tasks, like the BART. Specifically,
higher risk-taking in the context of APRT performance seems to be the failure of a respondent to
alter their behavior (e.g., Go Presses) in response to information indicating an increased chance
of Injury (e.g., there is little to no difference in Go Presses when Injury Magnitude or Probability
switches from low to high), whereas individuals with low or normal levels of risk-taking would
tend to heed this information more readily. In other words, risk-taking in APRT is indicated as
the magnitude of the difference in scores between the Injury variable conditions, rather than as
an overall score.
This tendency to ignore increases in risk can be further understood as the opposite of a
satisficing drive that seems to be present in the normal population. This is evidenced within
APRT through the pattern of the Points scores, which indicated that most participants would
become satisfied with the amount of Points they have earned in a trial after reaching a certain
limit, at which point they would quit the trial, even if Injury Probability and/or Magnitude was
low and Reward Magnitude was high (i.e., when they had low-risk opportunities to earn large
amounts of Points indefinitely). Thus, APRT presents a novel conceptualization of risk-taking: a
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contextual insensitivity to increases in risk. This definition is a direct complement to the existing
concept of satisficing, which describes the tendency of most individuals to pursue a suboptimal
target (i.e., not maximizing reward) in exchange for decreased risk (Mohamed, 2006). Satisficing
has presently been more heavily examined (with respect to risk-taking) in behavioral economics
than in other branches of psychology (Parker, de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007). APRT thus
potentially merges risk-taking research across multiple domains under a uniform
conceptualization of risky behavior by providing separate operationalizations of risk-taking and
satisficing (Go Presses and Points, respectively).
There are a number of limitations to consider when interpreting the findings of the
current study. First and foremost, the sample was likely underpowered. When I conducted my
power analysis to determine sample size, I was only considering main effects and did not account
for the fourfold increase required for interactions of the same effect size (Leon & Heo, 2009).
Thus, the actual sample size required to detect the anticipated effect sizes of any interactions
would have been over 800, much more than the 256 participants I had. In this light, there may
have been additional interaction effects that were not detected by my analyses due to insufficient
power.
Another limitation was the limited engagement of many of the participants in the study.
While I initially had considered excluding participants who had zero Go Presses for half or more
of the APRT trials, I recognized that this would have eliminated around a third of the sample,
which would have resulted in the sample being insufficiently powered to detect even the main
effect sizes I anticipated. Thus, while I kept these participants in the sample for the sake of
preserving power (as well as to not potentially eliminate a subgroup of participants that may
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have indeed simply been very cautious, as opposed to disinterested, during the task), their high
number of zero-scored trials likely skewed the means for all four outcome scores.
The significant main effects for Delay may also have been a function of these zero Go
Presses trials, as participants that were given the response delay tended to have more of these
trials on average. Delay may have thus acted as an unintentional motivator for an unmeasured
“reward” to participants: the ability to finish the experiment sooner. A study has previously
shown that participants were willing to sacrifice further potential reward on BART trials when
they were given a similar type of delay, if that sacrifice meant being able to complete the
experiment in a significantly faster time (Young, Webb, Rung, & McCoy, 2014). Since APRT
involves a similar repetitive, repeated measure type task, a similar effect may have been present
in the current study, especially if the delayed participants were feeling particularly bored or
fatigued by the task. This potential effect served as an additional reason to not exclude
participants with low engagement in APRT.
Beyond this unintentional effect of the delay condition, the high number of participants
refusing to make even a single Go Press on a very large number of trials, regardless of whether
they received the delay or not, suggests possible issues with the sample population itself being
generally uninterested or disengaged while completing the study, a problem frequently found in
psychological research using college students (Peterson & Merunka, 2014). Furthermore, the
sample in the study was a convenience sample drawn from university psychology majors, a
group not particularly known to be high in risk-taking behavior, compared to other groups such
as criminals or substance abusers (Knust & Stewart, 2002; Wills, Vaccaro, & McNamara, 1994).
There is thus far less variation in APRT scores than might be expected from a more diverse
sample or a sample drawn from populations known to be high in risk-taking. This limitation
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likely has impacted the strength and significance of the observed effects by estimating these
parameters from only a small portion of the true distribution of APRT scores.
There are also several limitations stemming from the APRT trials themselves. Firstly,
each of the 64 trials represents a unique combination of the within-subject manipulations. This
means that there may be more complex interaction effects present (3-way or even up to 5-way),
which were not examined due to the difficulty (if not impossibility) of conceptually explaining
them in ecologically useful terms (i.e., what they mean in terms of real-world risky decision
making). A second issue with the APRT trials is the design of the Picture Type condition. The
picture categories were ultimately determined on the basis of convenience, as I wished to avoid
copyright issues and was limited by what pictures were available for free use. Thus, despite my
best efforts, the categories may not be the best representation of different types of physically
risky behaviors. Images of more disparate types of physically risky behaviors may have resulted
in stronger effect sizes, or at least may have allowed for a more structured or meaningful
approach to the design of these variable conditions.
A final limitation to this study is its failure to include any assessment of life history
factors that might have impacted the results of some participants. Life history theory is a
commonly used framework for understanding and analyzing human behavior in evolutionary
biology, anthropology, and other fields, in addition to psychology (Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014).
Previous research on life history variables and risk-taking has suggested that in addition to a
basic gender difference in risk-taking propensity, factors such as age, parental status, birth order,
number of siblings, and subjective life expectancy all substantially impact an individual’s risktaking, particularly in the physical risk domain that APRT assess (Wang, Kruger, & Wilke,
2009). Many of these have an evolutionary explanation (e.g., a mother taking less risks to ensure
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she can continue caring for her children or taking more risks in order to protect them from harm).
Future studies should include measures of these factors and attempt to account for them when
using the APRT to assess risk-taking.
Despite the limitations of the study and its task, this study marks the comprehensive
assessment of the elements of risk taking across a variety of risky behaviors using a single
behavioral task. While some of these factors are present in other behavioral risk-taking tasks,
they are rarely examined or analyzed in any way, and these other tasks each only examine a
single risky behavior (Bechara, 2007; Lejuez et al., 2002). APRT directly addresses these
shortcomings while retaining the positive features of these measures (e.g., the simplicity of the
task).
Many of the present issues with APRT could also likely be improved by revising certain
aspects of the measure (e.g., creating more conceptually distinct and meaningful categories for
Picture Type). If such improvements are made, APRT may mark the next major leap in research
concerning behavioral assessment of risk-taking, as it would be the first to provide a
comprehensive assessment of the elements of risk across a variety of different risky activities, in
addition to providing a novel conceptualization of risk-taking itself.
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Appendix

Table 1
Summary of Reward/Injury Probabilities and Severities
Variable

Low

High

Injury Magnitude (per injury)

Randomized Range: 5-35

Randomized Range: 60-90

Reward Magnitude (per reward)

Randomized Range: 5-25

Randomized Range: 50-250

Injury Probability

1/15

1/5

Reward Probability

2/3

9/10

Table 2
Summary of Generalized Estimating Equation Model Effects (Wald χ2) for Points, Go Presses,
Injuries, and Health
Model Effect

df

Points

Go Presses

Remaining
Injuries
Health
87.07**
109.74**
77.94**

Picture Type

3

45.60**

Injury Magnitude

1

323.89**

533.05**

579.21**

339.64**

Reward Magnitude

1

4879.81**

17.95**

11.21**

11.50**

Injury Probability

1

863.75**

1172.02**

231.73**

254.92**

Reward Probability

1

258.11**

Delay

1

3.59

Picture Type x Injury
Magnitude
Picture Type x Reward
Magnitude
Picture Type x Injury
Probability
Picture Type x Reward
Probability

3

8.51**

2.69

9.00**

27.75**

22.13**

3.94

22.38**

76.59**

23.39**

3

2.26

3.98

21.84**

7.68

3

14.65**

31.91**

17.13**

33.02**

3

1.05

5.80

11.96*

27.72**
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2.75

Injury Magnitude x Reward
Magnitude
Injury Magnitude x Injury
Probability
Injury Magnitude x Reward
Probability
Reward Magnitude x Injury
Probability
Reward Magnitude x Reward
Probability
Injury Probability x Reward
Probability
Picture Type x Delay

1

24.27**

0.30

0.04

1

34.07**

71.19**

1

3.51

1.91

0.38

0.001

1

10.98**

2.59

1.14

0.02

1

0.90

14.87**

1.56

16.00**

1

15.74**

0.06

0.01

0.01

3

4.62

8.62*

17.08**

3.54

Injury Magnitude x Delay

1

5.76*

4.66*

0.01

0.45

Reward Magnitude x Delay

1

0.03

0.17

0.05

0.03

Injury Probability x Delay

1

5.00*

3.15

0.97

11.02**

Reward Probability x Delay

1

0.48

0.03

5.74*

0.07

9.44**

6.14*
1.46

df= degrees of freedom. * p < .05 (uncorrected). ** padj < .05 (sequential Sidak corrected).
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Table 3
Decompositions of Statistically Significant APRT Interactions

Low v1/Low v2
Interaction (v1/v2)

M

SE

Low v1/High v2
M

SE

High v1/Low v2
Wald χ (1)
2

M

SE

High v1/High v2
M

SE

Wald
χ2(1)

POINTS
Injury
Probability/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Probability/AnimalCliff
Injury
Magnitude/Reward
Magnitude
Injury
Magnitude/Injury
Probability
Reward
Magnitude/Injury
Probability
Injury
Probability/Reward
Probability

0.00
196.94

10.80

196.35 10.26

51.74 3.87

66.45 3.83

8.70*

36.36 3.55

56.24 3.88

18.16***

9.00*
131.28

10.20

161.43

49.06

2.76

236.00

13.6

87.29

56.34

2.95

15.69

133.38

6.76

9.24
326.62***

18.02 1.11

204.41 9.16 467.55***

4.68

215.96***

121.29 5.586

30.38 1.98 273.27***

0.92

242.57***

508.05 26.58

168.95 7.94 238.68***

214.62 11.12

138.29***

36.54 2.29

72.57 3.42 150.27***

419.91 22.81

GO PRESSES
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Injury
Magnitude/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Magnitude/AnimalCliff
Injury
Probability/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Probability/AnimalCliff
Injury
Magnitude/Injury
Probability
Reward
Magnitude/Reward
Probability

7.38

0.40

7.46

0.39

0.15

3.82 0.21

4.80 0.21

13.80***

5.47

0.36

6.12

0.36

10.46**

3.00 0.21

3.84 0.19

21.78***

8.48

0.44

8.54

0.43

0.05

3.33 0.19

4.19 0.19

29.57***

5.90

0.42

6.85

0.38

11.51**

2.78 0.18

3.43 0.18

21.56***

9.02

0.51

4.79

0.25

202.59***

6.00 0.30

2.43 0.11 264.80***

5.50

0.27

4.96

0.25

14.88***

4.69 0.25

4.88 0.25

2.14

REMAINING HEALTH
Injury
Magnitude/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Magnitude/AnimalCliff
Reward
Magnitude/Disaster
-Hero
Reward
Magnitude/AnimalCliff

77.99

1.20

78.03

1.19

0.003

62.56 1.59

56.03 1.47

35.24***

82.39

1.11

81.61

1.11

1.40

70.43 1.54

64.91 1.44

23.45***

67.22

1.52

68.02

1.38

0.35

73.32 1.36

66.04 1.35

51.08***

75.19

1.45

73.28

1.31

2.15

77.64 1.34

73.25 1.34

12.74**
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Injury
Probability/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Probability/AnimalCliff
Injury
Magnitude/Injury
Probability
Delay/DisasterHero
Delay/Animal-Cliff

72.76

1.36

72.17

1.31

0.36

67.79 1.44

61.88 1.37

29.30***

81.04

1.24

77.23

1.23

14.52***

71.79 1.42

69.29 1.35

5.84

83.49

1.04

76.52

1.45

186.78***

68.11 1.32

58.85 1.45 148.13***

64.11

2.00

61.25

2.00

5.87

64.11 1.65

72.80 1.53

9.05***

71.94

2.00

65.15

2.12

28.14**

80.88 1.56

81.37 1.8

0.18

INJURIES
Injury
Magnitude/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Magnitude/AnimalCliff
Injury
Probability/Disaster
-Hero
Injury
Probability/AnimalCliff
Reward
Probability/Disaster
-Hero

1.00

0.05

1.03

0.05

1.00

0.51 0.02

0.63 0.02

30.25***

0.77

0.05

0.86

0.05

7.11**

0.40 0.03

0.50 0.02

20.25***

0.65

0.03

0.65

0.03

0.004

0.79 0.04

1.00 0.04

29.30***

0.46

0.03

0.52

0.03

9.00

0.68 0.04

0.82 0.04

21.78***

0.74

0.04

0.77

0.03

16.00***

0.70 0.04

0.84 0.04

21.78***
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Reward
Probability/AnimalCliff
0.60
0.04
0.65 0.03
4.00
0.52 0.03
0.66 0.03 49.00***
Reward
Magnitude/Reward
Probability
0.74
0.03
0.67 0.03
16.89***
0.64 0.03
0.66 0.03
1.67***
Delay/Injury
Probability
0.75
0.05
0.96 0.06 144.00***
0.44 0.03
0.70 0.04 169.00***
Note. For interactions involving Delay, “Low” is considered the non-delayed participants, while “High” denotes delayed participants.
For interactions involving Animal/Cliff/Hero/Disaster, Animal and Disaster are considered “Low” and Cliff and Hero are considered
“High.” *padj < .05. ** padj < .01. *** padj < .001.
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Table 4
Summary of Support for Hypotheses
Hypothesis
1. Main effects for all within-subject
IVs across all four DVs.

Overall
Support
Yes

Comment
Except for Reward
Probability on Go Presses
and Injuries

2. Delay x Injury Magnitude and Delay
x Injury Probability interactions on
Go Presses, Points, and Injuries.

Mixed

Only for some DVs

3. Delay x Picture Type interaction on
Points, Go Presses, and Remaining
Health
4. Reward Magnitude x Injury
Magnitude interaction on Points

No

Only for Go Presses

Yes

5. Picture Type x Injury Magnitude
and Picture Type x Injury
Probability interaction on Points,
Injuries, and Go Presses
6. Injury Probability x Reward
Probability interaction across all
four DVs

50

Yes

Except for Injury Magnitude
on Points

No

Only for Points
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